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Introduction 
This paper presents the first attempt to estimate jointly three types of discrete-choice 
labor decisions of farm couples: farm work, off-farm work, and hired farm labor. Most 
empirical analyses of farmers’ time allocations have focused on off-farm labor decisions. 
Few studies looked at either off-farm work and hired labor jointly or at off-farm work and 
farm work jointly. Here we estimate a model that encompasses all three decisions, using 
recent French farm census data. 
In particular, we estimate a multinomial logit model with 16 choices, including all the 
permutations of four binary decisions: farm operator’s off-farm work, spouse’s farm work, 
spouse’s off-farm work, and hired farm labor. All farm operators in our data set work on the 
farm by definition. Most previous analyses of the farmers’ time allocation problem looked at 
the off-farm labor participation of the farm operators (e.g., Sumner 1982) or the joint off-
farm labor participation of farm operators and their spouses (Huffman and Lange 1989; 
Tokle and Huffman 1991; Lass and Gempesaw 1992). Buttel and Gillespie (1984), Kimhi 
(1994) and Kimhi and Lee (1996) analyzed the joint farm labor and off-farm labor 
participation decisions of farm couples. Findeis and Lass (1992) and Benjamin, Corsi and 
Guyomard (1996) looked jointly at off-farm labor participation and the use of hired labor. 
Benjamin, Corsi and Guyomard (1996), in an earlier analysis of French data, 
concluded that hired labor is a complement for the operator’s farm work and a substitute for 
the spouse’s farm work. However, this conclusion was reached without directly allowing for 
endogenous farm labor participation decisions. We believe that a more complete system of 
interrelations between the labor decisions can be found by adding the farm labor participation 
decision.  
The following section provides a theoretical background and describes the empirical 
approach used in this paper. Most applications in the literature used a joint estimation of a   4
system of participation equations for similar problems. Our view is that this strategy suffers 
from an internal incoherency problem. We described the alternative approach, which 
estimates a multinomial model. The paper continues with a presentation of the data used in 
this study and descriptive statistics of the dependent and explanatory variables. After that, the 
empirical results are presented and discussed. 
 
Theory and empirical approach 
Farm household models have been used for more than two decades to motivate 
empirical studies of farmers’ time allocation. These models assume a unitary model of 
household utility maximization over consumption and leisure of all family members, subject to 
time and budget constraints. Huffman (1991) provided the most common specification of such 
models. Kimhi (1994) extended this specification to allow for zero farm work, after observing 
that in a multiple-person household, it is not necessarily true that all household members work 
on the family farm. There have been two opposite approaches in the literature to the treatment of 
hired labor. The original approach considered hired labor and family labor as perfect substitutes, 
and assumed that the wage of hired workers is equal to the off-farm wage of the farm family. In 
this case one obtains the usual separability property, that the wage determines farm labor input 
regardless of the off-farm participation decisions of family members. The opposite approach has 
been not to assume perfect substitutability, and treat hired labor as another farm input that does 
not deserve special attention when analyzing farmers’ time allocation decisions. 
In this paper, we too do not assume that hired labor and family labor are perfect 
substitutes, but we want to deal explicitly with hired labor for the sake of the empirical analysis. 
This is what Benjamin, Corsi and Guyomard (1996) did in their earlier study of French farm 
households, but they assumed an internal solution for the couple’s farm labor input, and here we 
want to allow for corner solutions with respect to spouse’s farm labor input. Hence, we use the   5
concept of “effective labor input”, introduced by Deolalikar and Vijverberg (1987), which is a 
function of family labor input and hired labor input. Effective labor input is not necessarily 
measured in hours of work. In fact the unit of measurement is not important, because effective 
labor input appears as an argument in the farm production function only and does not have a 
market price. What is important for our purposes is that effective labor input is positive while 
individual labor inputs may be zero. Of course, at least one of the individual labor inputs must 
be positive. 
Specifically, we assume that household utility (U) is a function of household 
consumption (C) and the vector of household members' home time, Th (housework and leisure). 
Each household member can use his time endowment (T) for farm work (Tf), market work (Tm), 
and/or home time. Hence, the time constraint is (in vector notation): 
 
(1)  Tf + Tm + Th = T.  
 
Non-negativity constraints are imposed on market work and farm work of each household 
member:  Tf  ≥  0 and Tm  ≥  0. Consumption is constrained by household income, which is 
composed of: (i) net farm income, which is explained below; (ii) off-farm labor income, which 
is the sum of off-farm earnings of all household members (Ymi); and (iii) non-labor income (Yo). 
Net farm income is farm income (Yf), which is a function of effective farm labor input (Lf), 
minus the expenditures on hired workers (E), which is a nonlinear function of hired labor input 
(H). Effective labor input is denoted as Lf(Tf,H). The resulting budget constraint is: 
 
(2)   C = Yf[Lf(Tf,H);Zf] - E(H) + ΣiYmi(Tmi ;Zmi) + Yo. 
   6
The household optimization problem is to maximize U(C, Th; Zu) subject to the time, 
budget, and non-negativity constraints, where Zj are exogenous shifters of function j. The 
optimal solution is characterized by the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, which are the first-order 
conditions for maximizing the Lagrange function: 
 
(3)   U(C ,Th; Zu) + λ⋅{ Yf[Lf(Tf,H);Zf] - E(H) + ΣiYmi (Tmi; Zmi) + Yo – C} + 
      +   µt⋅[T - Tf - Tm - Th] + µf⋅Tf + µm⋅Tm + µH⋅H 
 
over {C, Th, Tf, Tm, H} and minimizing it over {λ, µt, µf, µm, µH}. The farm work and off-farm 
work participation conditions of family members are, respectively, a subset of the Kuhn-Tucker 
conditions: 
 
(4)  ∂Yf /∂Lf ⋅∂Lf /∂Tf ≤ µt /λ  
(5)  ∂Ym /∂Tm ≤ µt /λ  
 
(in vector notation), where µt = ∂U/∂Th and λ = ∂U/∂C. Participation (an internal solution) 
occurs when the equality holds. Similarly, the decision to use hired labor on the farm relies on 
the condition: 
 
(6)  ∂Yf /∂Lf ⋅∂Lf /∂H ≤ E’(H) /λ  
 
If an interior solution occurs for all choices (all household members work both on and 
off the farm and hired labor is used on the farm), the participation equations (4)-(6) and the 
constraints (1)-(2) can be solved for the endogenous variables {C, Th, Tf, Tm, H, λ, µt, µf, µm, 
µH} as functions of all the exogenous variables Zu, Zf, Zm, Yo, and T. This is the reduced-form   7
solution. Using this solution in the participation equations, we can then determine which of the 
labor participation conditions is satisfied. If n is the number of potential workers in the 
household, there are 2n+1 participation equations, taking the forms: 
 
(4)’     fj (Zu, Zf, Zm, Yo, T) ≤ g (Zu, Zf, Zm, Yo, T),    j=1...n;   
(5)’    hj (Zmj) ≤ g (Zu, Zf, Zm, Yo, T),     j=1...n;   
(6)’    k (Zu, Zf, Zm, Yo, T) ≤ m (Zu, Zf, Zm, Yo, T).  
 
These participation equations are obtained by inserting the internal solution in (4)-(6), and 
replacing the relevant variable in each equation by zero.  
Empirical applications of farmers’ time allocation decisions mostly focused on the off-
farm participation decisions, thereby estimating equations (5)’ only, after adding multivariate 
normal additive stochastic terms. Earlier applications looked only at the farm operator, thereby 
using a binary probit model. Other applications looked at the joint participation decisions of the 
farm couple (operator and spouse), and mostly used a bivariate probit model. This approach 
suffers from an internal coherency problem. Recall that the right hand side of equation (5)’ is 
obtained by dividing the internal solutions for µt and λ. If one specifies the spouse’s off-farm 
participation equation as a probit equation, the coefficients of that equation are assumed to be 
independent of the operator’s off-farm participation status. In fact, if the operator is not working 
off the farm, the internal solution is not relevant for the spouse’s off-farm participation decision, 
and what needs to be used in the right hand side of (5’) is a solution that is conditioned on the 
operator’s off-farm labor supply being zero. Benjamin, Corsi and Guyomard (1996) showed that 
individual A’s off-farm wage is only relevant for the off-farm participation decision of 
individual B if in fact individual A is working off the farm. Kimhi (1999) used a similar 
argument for the joint estimation of farmer women’s farm and off-farm work participation   8
equations, and showed that farm attributes affects on the off-farm participation decision 
significantly only when the woman is working on the farm. However, the endogenous switching 
model of Kimhi (1999) does not solve the problem completely since it imposes a one-direction 
conditioning of the participation equations, while in theory all participation equations are 
determined simultaneously. 
A different approach that does not suffer from this internal coherency problem is the 
indirect utility maximization approach, which has been used by Benjamin, Corsi and Guyomard 
(1996) and by Ahituv and Kimhi (2002). In this approach, a labor regime is defined as one 
combination of outcomes of all the participation equations. The solutions for consumption and 
leisure in each regime are inserted into the utility function to yield a regime-specific indirect 
utility measure. The household is assumed to choose the regime that yields the highest indirect 
utility. The probabilistic model is obtained after adding a regime-specific additive error term to 
each of the deterministic indirect utility measures. A multinomial probit is obtained if a 
multivariate normal distribution is assumed for the stochastic errors. Alternatively, a 
multinomial logit model is obtained if the errors are assumed to have i.i.d. Weibull distributions. 
In this paper we adopt the multinomial logit specification due to the relatively large number of 
regimes that makes multinomial probit impractical unless one is willing to use simulation 
techniques. 
 
Data and descriptive statistics 
We use data from the 2000 General French Census of Agriculture. A random sample 
corresponding to 10% of the whole sample was drawn from that Census, totaling 65,593 family 
farms. The data set includes various farm and family attributes and personal characteristics of 
family members. In particular, it includes information on farm labor supply of family members 
and hired workers, and whether the operator and/or spouse work off the farm. We selected only   9
farms operated by couples rather than by single operators, and only those in which the operator 
and spouse are between 18 and 65 years of age. In order to focus on family composition effects, 
we also excluded families that included elderly parents or siblings (older than 65 years of age). 
After eliminating observations with missing data, our working sample included 35,641 farms. 
We divided this sample into 16 labor regimes, including all the permutations of the binary 
variables indicating the female's work on the farm, the male's work off the farm, the female's 
work off the farm, and hired labor use on the farm. Note that all males reported working on the 
farm. Table 1 shows the households' distribution in the sample according to the sixteen labor 
regimes. About 33% of the males and 42% of the females work off the farm, and about 35% of 
the farms use hired labor. The previous General Census of the French Agriculture was in 1988. 
The most significant change over the last twelve years has been the substantial growth in off-
farm labor participation by farm spouses 
Explanatory variables include personal characteristics, family composition indicators, 
and farm attributes. Personal characteristics include age, agricultural education, general 
education, agricultural training since 1988, and number of years on the farm. Family 
composition indicators include the number of family members in various age groups: 0-6, 7-12, 
13-17, and 18-65. Farm attributes include size category, major crop or livestock, the existence of 
diversification activities (accommodations, tourism, crafts, processing or sales of farm products), 
participation in a structural improvement program, receiving a farm set-up subsidy since 1988, 
and partnership status. Table 2 includes the definitions of explanatory variables and their sample 
means. We consider all these variables as pre-determined, although it may be argued that some 
of them are determined simultaneously with the labor regimes. Given this, one should be 
cautious when making causal interpretation of the results. However, this assumption enables a 
comparison to other results in the literature, as the vast majority of earlier studies used similar 
sets of explanatory variables.   10
We divide each of the educational attainment variables into three categories. The 
excluded group includes with less than secondary school leaving certificate. The two included 
binary variables are for those with a secondary school leaving certificate, and those with higher 
levels of education. We can see in table 3 that males are more likely to have had agricultural 
education and/or agricultural training than females, while females have higher general 
education. Regarding the number of adult family members, we see that more than half of the 
farm couples did not have any other family member older that 18 years. This is the excluded 
category. The farm size categories are defined using the concept of Standard Gross Margin 
(SGM). This is the value of output less the cost of variable inputs, calculated per crop or 
livestock item, by regions. The calculated SGM is using a three-year average of per-unit SGM 
multiplied by the number of actual units in each farm. An Economic Size Unit (ESU) represents 
a farm that is similar in SGM to 1.5 hectares of wheat. Among the farm type variables, the 
excluded category includes field-crop farms. 
 
Empirical results 
The multinomial logit results are reported in table 3. The excluded labor regime is 
regime 9, in which neither the male nor the female works off the farm, the female does not work 
on the farm, and no hired labor is employed on the farm. Each coefficient therefore represents 
the effect of an explanatory variable on the tendency of the farm family to choose a particular 
regime over the alternative of regime 9. Alternatively, one can think of each coefficient as the 
difference between the coefficients of a particular explanatory variable in the indirect utility 
functions of a particular regime and regime 9. To save space, we only report whether each 
coefficient is statistically significant at the 5% or the 1% levels (The full results, including 
standard errors and t-statistics, are available from the authors upon request). We find that each of 
the explanatory variables has statistically significant coefficients in at least some of the regimes.   11
However, because of the number of regimes it is not easy to interpret the coefficients. Hence, as 
in Benjamin, Corsi and Guyomard (1996), we derive the marginal effects of the explanatory 
variables. For the continuous explanatory variables (the ages, years on farm, and the numbers of 
young family members) we compute the derivatives of the probabilities of the regimes with 
respect to each of the explanatory variables, at the sample means of the explanatory variables. 
For the binary explanatory variables, we take the difference between two computed 
probabilities, one conditional on the variable being equal to unity and one conditional on the 
variable being equal to zero, when all other explanatory variables are at their sample means. In 
this latter computation we take into account that when a variable such as a certain farm type 
obtains the value of unity, all other farm type variables must obtain the value of zero.  
Rather than presenting all the marginal effects (they are available from the authors), we 
compute the marginal effects of the explanatory variables on the marginal probabilities each of 
the participation indicators (female's work on the farm, male's work off the farm, female's work 
off the farm, and hired labor use on the farm), by adding up the marginal effects on the eight 
categories in which the relevant participation indicator obtains the value of unity. It is easier to 
interpret the marginal effects in this way. These are reported in table 4. Each marginal effect is 
accompanied by a pair of numbers in parentheses. The first number is the number of significant 
coefficients that have the same sign as the marginal effect, in the eight categories in which the 
relevant participation indicator obtains the value of unity. The second number is the number of 
significant coefficients that have a sign that is opposite to the sign of the marginal effect, in these 
same eight categories. Hence, the most reliable marginal effects are those that are accompanied 
by a (8,0) pair. The least reliable would be a marginal effect that is accompanied by a (0,8) pair. 
The sum of the two numbers in a pair could be at most eight. Eight minus the sum is the number 
of insignificant coefficients.   12
Starting with the personal characteristics, we find that an individual’s age is negatively 
related to his/her off-farm work participation. This is true at the sample means, note in table 3 
that the effects of age are nonlinear. Male and female ages have other significant effects, but one 
has to be cautions about these effects because the age coefficients are potentially contaminated 
by multicollinearity. Male agricultural education is negatively related to his off-farm work 
participation, while female agricultural education is positively related to her farm work 
participation and to the male’s off-farm work participation. Male general education, on the other 
hand, is positively related to his off-farm work participation and to the female’s farm work 
participation. Female general education is positively related to her off-farm work participation. It 
seems like the female’s farm labor substitutes for the male’s farm labor when she has more 
agricultural education and when he has more general education. Hired labor responds positively 
to all levels of education, both agricultural and general, of both the male and the female. The 
effect of agricultural education on hired labor could be due to an income effect: more educated 
farmers are more efficient, make more money on the farm, and afford to hire workers while 
devoting part of their own labor input to managerial tasks or even increase their leisure 
activities. The effect of general education on hired labor could be due to both income and 
substitution effects, as these effects work in the same direction. Training of either the male or the 
female has similar effects as agricultural education, and years of farm experience have similar 
effects as male agricultural education. 
Children and adolescents are negatively related to both spouses’ off-farm labor 
participation. Children up to age six are also negatively related to the spouse’s farm labor 
participation. Other adults in the household are positively related to the couple’s off-farm labor 
participation and negatively related to the female’s farm labor participation and to hired labor. It 
seems like other adults substitute for the farm labor input of both the farm couple and hired 
workers.   13
We now turn to the farm attributes. Receiving a set-up subsidy since 1988 is negatively 
related to the couple’s off-farm work participation and to the use of hired labor, but also to the 
female’s farm work participation. Perhaps this variable is correlated with being a relatively 
young family and hence with the number of young children. Structural improvement on the farm 
is also negatively related to the couple’s off-farm work participation, but is positively related to 
the female’s farm work participation and to the use of hired labor. These farms are likely to be 
more productive hence require more labor input due to a scale effect. Diversification activities 
on the farm have the same signs of marginal effects as structural improvement, and this makes 
sense because these activities demand labor input. Partnership farms are negatively related to 
off-farm work participation and to the female’s farm work participation, and positively related to 
hired labor. Perhaps the dominant form of partnership is an intergenerational partnership where 
the female specializes in household tasks of the extended family. Farm size is strongly 
associated with lower off-farm labor participation, higher female’s farm labor participation and 
higher use of hired labor. The type of farm is also relevant for the labor choices, with most farm 
types requiring more labor than the excluded type of field-crop farms. 
 
Discussion 
Most of the explanatory variables have opposite-sign correlations with the female’s farm 
work participation and her off-farm participation. This is a direct consequence of the female’s 
binding time constraint. Most farm attributes and family variables have same-sign correlations 
with the male’s and the female’s off-farm participation. The opposite is true for the personal 
characteristics, because they often indicate a comparative advantage of one individual in farm or 
off-farm work that leads to increased specialization within the family. The farm attributes 
represent the farm labor demand, and hence also have positive correlations with hired labor. 
Family composition variables represent the demand for labor in household tasks (children) or the   14
supply of labor (other adults). These affect both male and female similarly, and the correlations 
with hired labor are similar in sign to the correlations with female’s farm labor participation. The 
effects of the number of other adults indicate that other adult substitute for the farm labor of the 
farm couple and also for hired labor. This conclusion may be relevant for policies that aim to 
promote farm succession by adult children of farm couples, but more work is required in this 
direction (see Kimhi 2001). 
Unlike the conclusions of Benjamin, Corsi and Guyomard (1996), we find that the 
females’ time allocation responds to farm-related incentives just as the males’, and we also find 
that the females’ farm labor substitutes for males’ farm labor in certain circumstances. In 
addition, we find that hired labor mostly complements both male and female farm labor. Perhaps 
what we see here is an increased sharing of tasks and responsibilities of males and females, both 
on and off the farm, relative to earlier years. 
Including the female’s farm work participation among the dependent variables seems to 
be important. Not only are many coefficients of regime 1 statistically significant (table 3), it can 
easily be seen that the coefficients of regimes 2-8 are quite different from the coefficients of 
regimes 10-16. Hence, without taking explicit account of the female’s farm labor participation, 
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on the farm 
Male works 
off the farm 
Female works 





1  yes no no no 23.1 
2  yes no no yes 14.2 
3  yes no yes  no  3.8 
4  yes no yes  yes  2.8 
5 yes  yes  no  no  6.9 
6 yes  yes  no  yes  3.4 
7 yes  yes  yes  no  4.5 
8 yes  yes  yes  yes  1.9 
9 no   no no no  4.2 
10 no  no  no  yes  2.1 
11 no  no  yes  no  10.1 
12 no  no  yes  yes  7.1 
13 no  yes  no  no  3.0 
14 no  yes  no  yes  0.8 
15 no  yes  yes  no  9.8 
16 no  yes  yes  yes  2.4 
Note: All males reported working on the farm. 
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Table 2. Definitions and Means of Explanatory Variables 
 
Variable Description  Unit  Mean 
Age male    Years  46.85 
Age female    Years  44.21 
Ag educ m2  Male agricultural education, secondary school 





Ag educ m3  Male agricultural education, higher level  0/1  0.15 
Ag educ f2  Female agricultural education, secondary 





Ag educ f3  Female agricultural education, higher level  0/1  0.04 
Gen educ m2  Male general education, secondary school 





Gen educ m3  Male general education, higher level  0/1  0.15 
Gen educ f2  Female general education, secondary school 





Gen educ f3  Female general education, higher level  0/1  0.32 
Training m  Male agricultural training since 1988  0/1  0.15 
Training f  Female agricultural training since 1988  0/1  0.08 






Family 0-6  Number of family members up to 6 years of age  Persons  0.27 
























3+ other adults  Family includes at least 5 members from 18 to 





Setup subsidy  Obtaining a farm set-up subsidy since 1988  0/1  0.15 
Struct improv  Having a structural improvement on the farm  0/1  0.08 
Diversification Having  diversification activities on the farm  0/1  0.21 
Partnership  The farm is part of a partnership  0/1  0.22 
Size 2-3  Standard gross margin between 4 and 16 ECU  0/1  0.15 
Size 4  Standard gross margin between 16 and 40 ECU  0/1  0.13 






Size 6  Standard gross margin higher than 100 ECU  0/1  0.32 
Type 2  Horticulture farm  0/1  0.20 
Type 3  Fruit and wine production  0/1  0.24 
Type 4  Dairy and beef cattle  0/1  0.12 
Type 5-6  Hogs, poultry and other cultures  0/1  0.11 
Type 7  Mixed livestock farms  0/1  0.11   19
Table 3. Multinomial Logit Results 
Variable  Regime 1 Regime  2 Regime  3 Regime  4 Regime  5 Regime  6 Regime  7 Regime  8 
Intercept  -8.2797 **  -12.856 **  -9.6305 **  -14.756 **  -17.191 **  -16.319 **  -16.000 **  -18.582 ** 
Age male  0.0613   0.0664   -0.0902   0.1147 *  0.5551 **  0.4221 **  0.4575 **  0.3890 ** 
Agesq/100 male  -0.0074   -0.0338   0.1255 *  -0.1198 *  -0.6407 **  -0.4624 **  -0.5946 **  -0.4715 ** 
Age female  0.2879 **  0.3710 **  0.5737 **  0.4638 **  0.3608 **  0.2578 **  0.5225 **  0.5034 ** 
Agesq/100 female  -0.3654 **  -0.4451 **  -0.7269 **  -0.5745 **  -0.4181 **  -0.3087 **  -0.6207 **  -0.6076 ** 
Ag educ m2  0.0022   0.1518   0.0912   0.224 *  -0.6715 **  -0.4961 **  -0.4855 **  -0.4121 ** 
Ag educ m3  -0.2411 *  0.2408 *  0.0367   0.3638 **  -0.7819 **  -0.4830 **  -0.6022 **  -0.0503  
Ag educ f2  0.8558 **  0.9363 **  0.5520 **  0.3321   0.9315 **  1.1205 **  0.7832 **  0.8080 ** 
Ag educ f3  1.2902 **  1.4291 **  1.1284 **  0.7983 **  1.6323 **  1.7324 **  1.3156 **  1.3790 ** 
Gen educ m2  0.0187   0.0935   -0.1654 *  0.0336   0.3770 **  0.5473 **  0.3255 **  0.6527 ** 
Gen educ m3  -0.0986   0.2380 *  -0.3156 *  0.0966   0.6182 **  1.1528 **  0.5421 **  0.7975 ** 
Gen educ f2  -0.2640 **  -0.0098   0.4066 **  0.4065 **  -0.2079 *  -0.0153   0.3232 **  0.0600  
Gen educ f3  -0.4945 **  0.0414   0.8593 **  1.2206 **  -0.3963 **  -0.0089   0.8280 **  0.8117 ** 
Training m  -0.0750   0.0473   0.2143   0.3996 **  -0.8047 **  -0.4076 **  -0.3436 *  -0.1363  
Training f  1.6170 **  1.8177 **  0.8506 **  1.0879 **  1.8566 **  1.9417 **  0.8250 **  0.9548 ** 
Years on farm  -0.0301 **  -0.0166 **  -0.0339 **  -0.0213 **  -0.0608 **  -0.0429 **  -0.0527 **  -0.0495 ** 
Family 0-6  -0.5133 **  -0.4341 **  -0.6107 **  -0.5297 **  -0.4571 **  -0.4475 **  -0.8619 **  -0.7080 ** 
Family 7-12  -0.2214 **  -0.1571 **  -0.4299 **  -0.3237 **  -0.2803 **  -0.2409 **  -0.5298 **  -0.3378 ** 
Family 13-17  -0.0591   -0.0604   -0.1857 **  -0.1172   -0.1773 **  -0.0971   -0.4050 **  -0.3129 ** 
One other adult  0.1075   0.0240   0.1486   -0.0318   0.4595 **  0.4250 **  0.2926 **  0.1785  
Two other adults  -0.0598   -0.1951 *  0.0582   -0.3321 **  0.3178 **  0.2782 *  0.1160   0.1237  
3+ other adults  -0.1359   -0.4847 **  -0.0437   -0.4375 *  0.5374 **  0.2182   -0.1625   -0.5350 * 
Setup subsidy  -0.2326 *  -0.2960 *  -0.3904 **  -0.4202 **  -0.6999 **  -0.6412 **  -1.1174 **  -1.2054 ** 
Struct improv  0.1946   0.3800 **  0.1080   0.2523   -0.1906   0.0433   -0.9583 **  -0.1053  
Diversification  0.4424 **  0.8853 **  0.2891 **  0.7348 **  0.0318   0.5338 **  -0.2058 *  0.4278 ** 
Partnership  -0.1618   0.3455 **  -0.4544 **  0.1533   -0.4995 **  -0.0967   -0.5830 **  0.1468  
Size 2-3  1.5802 **  2.0324 **  0.9812 **  1.3134 **  1.0561 **  1.4138 **  0.2659 *  0.9333 ** 
Size 4  2.2353 **  2.9218 **  1.2545 **  1.755 **  0.8966 **  1.9916 **  -0.5420 **  0.8841 ** 
Size 5  2.7245 **  3.8496 **  1.3349 **  2.5188 **  0.1702   2.0121 **  -1.8270 **  0.6372 ** 
Size 6  3.1385 **  4.7917 **  1.3489 **  3.2751 **  -0.1744   2.6469 **  -2.3728 **  1.0948 ** 
Type 2  0.3783 **  2.1808 **  -0.2948 *  1.7554 **  -0.1598   1.8373 **  -0.4752 **  1.8826 ** 
Type 3  1.1475 **  0.5961 **  0.5115 **  0.3011 *  0.2100 *  -0.0058   -0.2430 *  -0.2967  
Type 4  0.8999 **  1.0002 **  0.1415   0.4884 **  -0.1599   0.4069 **  -0.8267 **  0.0020  
Type 5-6  0.8400 **  1.2553 **  -0.0201   0.7536 **  0.0572   0.6625 **  -0.6316 **  -0.0172  
Type 7  0.6981 **  0.5379 **  0.2314   0.2868 *  -0.0170   0.0334   -0.5410 **  -0.6046 ** 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.   20
Table 3. Multinomial Logit Results (continued) 
Variable  Regime 9 Regime  10 Regime  11 Regime  12 Regime  13 Regime  14 Regime  15 Regime  16 
Intercept  0   -4.9545 **  -6.564 **  -11.845 **  -13.014 **  -11.707 **  -13.6 **  -17.926 ** 
Age male  0   0.0872   -0.05   0.0661   0.7263 **  0.4035 **  0.504 **  0.4418 ** 
Agesq/100 male  0   -0.0971   0.0289   -0.0954 *  -0.8644 **  -0.4451 **  -0.6506 **  -0.5595 ** 
Age female  0   -0.0034   0.4713 **  0.4388 **  0.05   0.1036   0.451 **  0.4743 ** 
Agesq/100 female  0   0.002   -0.5929 **  -0.5546 **  -0.0554   -0.166 *  -0.5614 **  -0.5605 ** 
Ag educ m2  0   0.1134   0.1146   0.1534   -0.238 *  -0.3631 *  -0.2851 **  -0.1992  
Ag educ m3  0   0.3848 **  0.2319 *  0.5813 **  -0.0751   -0.3385   0.2918 *  0.4685 ** 
Ag educ f2  0   0.0624   -0.3143 *  -0.6965 **  -0.3593   -1.4609 *  -0.4542 *  -0.2735  
Ag educ f3  0   0.637 *  0.0336   0.4816 *  -0.2428   0.6861   -0.0236   0.6677 * 
Gen educ m2  0   0.0619   -0.1231   0.1212   0.2785 **  0.4801 **  0.0961   0.1514  
Gen educ m3  0   0.3839 *  -0.3393 **  0.0327   0.2669 *  1.2104 **  0.1278   0.4835 ** 
Gen educ f2  0   -0.0329   0.5463 **  0.802 **  -0.0639   -0.1979   0.5133 **  0.2961 * 
Gen educ f3  0   0.3933 **  1.3752 **  1.9524 **  -0.0352   0.3069   1.1504 **  1.4327 ** 
Training m  0   0.2481 *  0.2869 **  0.4123 **  -0.3619 *  -0.3087   -0.2352 *  0.2657 * 
Training f  0   0.3677   -1.0754 **  -1.0853 **  -0.5633   0.0745   -1.1677 **  -0.3766  
Years on farm  0   -0.0018   -0.0155 **  -0.004   -0.0241 **  -0.0226 **  -0.0303 **  -0.0252 ** 
Family 0-6  0   0.0246   -0.3965 **  -0.3028 **  0.0571   -0.1186   -0.5959 **  -0.3652 ** 
Family 7-12  0   -0.0733   -0.3491 **  -0.2192 **  -0.1719 *  -0.059   -0.5966 **  -0.505 ** 
Family 13-17  0   -0.0686   -0.2348 **  -0.174 **  -0.0002   -0.1552   -0.3663 **  -0.3708 ** 
One other adult  0   -0.1584   0.2455 **  0.1117   0.2364 *  0.3609 *  0.3614 **  0.1398  
Two other adults  0   0.0259   0.2257 *  0.0511   0.3821 **  0.461 *  0.1142   -0.0643  
3+ other adults  0   0.0019   0.4701 **  0.3249 *  0.5793 **  0.2952   0.3721 *  0.576 ** 
Setup subsidy  0   -0.768 **  -0.1354   -0.26 *  -0.7511 **  -0.6217 *  -0.886 **  -1.0497 ** 
Struct improv  0   -0.0556   0.0413   0.2588 *  -1.3517 *  -0.1907   -0.4588 *  -0.0715  
Diversification  0   0.4619 **  -0.0659   0.4468 **  -0.3514 **  0.2244   -0.5251 **  0.2097 * 
Partnership  0   0.6595 **  -0.0692   0.3659 **  -0.2026   0.2627   -0.2379   0.1352  
Size 2-3  0   0.7374 **  0.3824 **  0.9007 **  -0.3959 **  0.5488 **  -0.3173 **  0.3017 * 
Size 4  0   0.8271 **  0.6466 **  1.3287 **  -1.3793 **  -0.0304   -1.2947 **  -0.1521  
Size 5  0   1.825 **  0.7131 **  2.0088 **  -2.6457 **  -0.1819   -2.4698 **  -0.355 * 
Size 6  0   2.626 **  0.7115 **  2.5154 **  -3.9624 **  0.5749 *  -3.5556 **  -0.0233  
Type 2  0   2.1436 **  -0.3176 **  1.7151 **  -0.7942 **  1.6712 **  -1.3847 **  1.4696 ** 
Type 3  0   -0.2432   0.1465   0.0363   -1.146 **  -0.7175 **  -1.1077 **  -0.4665 ** 
Type 4  0   0.2222   -0.2523 *  -0.0766   -1.2366 **  -0.3365   -1.5017 **  -0.7912 ** 
Type 5-6  0   0.6597 **  0.0237   0.6732 **  -1.3505 **  -0.0151   -1.4311 **  -0.1393  
Type 7  0   0.0456   0.1019   0.1271   -0.6927 **  -1.0915 **  -0.8154 **  -0.5214 ** 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Table 4. Marginal Effects 
 
Variable  Female farm work Male off-farm Female  off-farm Hired labor 
Age male  0.013  (5,0)  -0.015 (8,0)  -0.013 (6,1)  -0.001 (6,0) 
Age female  0.001  (8,0)  0.003  (7,0)  -0.006 (8,0)  0.002  (0,7) 
Ag educ m2  -0.021 (4,1)  -0.097 (7,0)  0.020 (1,3)  0.019  (1,3) 
Ag educ m3  -0.100 (3,4)  -0.063 (3,2)  0.095 (5,1)  0.080  (4,1) 
Ag educ f2  0.214  (7,0)  0.013  (4,2)  -0.165 (3,3)  0.013  (3,2) 
Ag educ f3  0.210  (8,0)  0.049  (5,0)  -0.151 (0,6)  0.042  (7,0) 
Gen educ m2  0.022  (4,1)  0.062  (6,0)  -0.023 (1,2)  0.035  (3,0) 
Gen educ m3  0.041  (5,1)  0.136  (7,0)  -0.056 (2,3)  0.101  (6,0) 
Gen educ f2  -0.092 (2,3)  0.002  (2,2)  0.133  (7,0)  0.031  (3,0) 
Gen educ f3  -0.257 (2,4)  0.006  (4,1)  0.351  (8,0)  0.101  (5,0) 
Training m  -0.061 (3,1)  -0.080 (3,3)  0.080  (4,2)  0.036  (4,1) 
Training f  0.316  (8,0)  0.015  (4,1) -0.287  (3,4)  0.048  (4,1) 
Years on farm  -0.004 (8,0)  -0.004 (8,0)  0.001  (0,7)  0.002  (0,6) 
Family 0-6  -0.048 (8,0)  -0.013 (6,0)  -0.019 (8,0)  0.015  (0,6) 
Family 7-12  0.008  (0,8)  -0.024 (7,0)  -0.047 (8,0)  0.015  (0,6) 
Family 13-17  0.020  (0,4)  -0.024 (6,0)  -0.041 (7,0)  0.004  (0,3) 
One other adult  -0.005 (0,3)  0.047  (6,0)  0.012  (3,0)  -0.021 (0,2) 
Two other adults  -0.032 (2,2)  0.044  (4,0)  0.020  (1,1)  -0.027 (2,2) 
3+ other adults  -0.108 (3,1)  0.067 (4,1)  0.068 (4,2)  -0.049 (3,2) 
Setup subsidy  -0.014 (8,0)  -0.097 (8,0) -0.023  (7,0)  -0.032  (8,0) 
Struct improv  0.037  (1,1)  -0.075 (4,0)  -0.033 (2,1)  0.044  (2,0) 
Diversification 0.095  (6,1)  -0.063 (3,3)  -0.075 (2,5)  0.110 (7,0) 
Partnership -0.035  (3,1)  -0.044  (3,0) -0.008  (2,1)  0.112  (3,0) 
Size 2-3  0.248  (8,0)  -0.156 (2,6)  -0.135 (1,7)  0.079  (8,0) 
Size 4  0.384  (7,1)  -0.395 (3,3)  -0.264 (2,5)  0.156  (6,0) 
Size 5  0.454  (6,1)  -0.601 (4,2)  -0.352 (3,5)  0.282  (6,1) 
Size 6  0.518  (6,1)  -0.648 (3,3)  -0.423 (2,5)  0.427  (7,0) 
Type 2  0.136  (5,2)  -0.092 (3,4)  -0.140 (4,4)  0.477  (8,0) 
Type 3  0.209  (5,1)  -0.196 (5,1)  -0.173 (3,2)  -0.040 (2,2) 
Type 4  0.230  (4,1)  -0.202 (4,1)  -0.220 (4,1)  0.066  (3,1) 
Type 5-6  0.180  (4,1)  -0.188 (3,1)  -0.183 (2,2)  0.135  (5,0) 
Type 7  0.133  (4,2)  -0.167 (6,0)  -0.122 (4,2)  0.001  (2,3) 
 
 
 